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Abstract
Machery et al. (2004) carried out an experiment which tests the intuition of US and
Chinese students about the use of proper names. They arrived at the conclusion
that the way most respondents used proper names is not compatible with the causal-
historical theory of proper names as advocated by Kripke. The author argues that
Machery et al. are wrong in their conclusions. The problem is not just that the
interpretation of the ﬁndings of their experiments does not take into account some
variables that should have been considered, but rather that the experiment is faulty
in several respects: their empirical hypothesis is arguably inconsistent, and the setup
of the experiment is ﬂawed.
Introduction
Machery et al. (2004) report an experiment to test certain semantic intu-
itions that are employed by philosophers of language to decide between
two (at least prima facie) incompatible theories of the semantics of proper
names. Among philosophers, it is widely accepted that these intuitions
clearly argue against the so-called descriptivist theory of names and in
favor of what Machery et al. call the causal-historical theory of names.
Although Machery and his co-authors do not explain this at length,
it is clear that one aim of this experiment is to contribute to the case for
a relativist view of human cognition: Those philosophers who assume the
causal-historical theory of names to be more adequate than the descrip-
tivist position base their opinion on intuitions that seem rather clear and
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unquestionable to themselves. However, according to Machery and his
co-authors, a problem arises because such philosophers (like Kripke) do
not only claim that the causal-historical theory captures their own way
of using proper names, but assume this claim to be universally valid, not
just for all speakers of English, but for all humans in general.
However, one could assume that Kripke is wrong to extend the valid-
ity of his claim in this way: his relevant intuitions might not agree with
the intuitions of other Westerners who are native speakers of English,
and there could be even greater disparities with regard to the intuitions
of representatives of other cultures. Machery et al. set out to demon-
strate that this is actually the case and not just a theoretical possibility.
They conduct an experiment in which a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
is found between answers (which are assumed to reﬂect relevant seman-
tic intuitions) of US and Chinese university students. This diﬀerence
is supposed to show that although some subjects in both groups report
intuitions which accord with the descriptivist theory of names, Chinese
students even more often report such intuitions. And thus the assumed
universal validity of the causal-historical theory is disproved.
I will argue that the authors are wrong in their conclusions. The
problem is not just that the interpretation of the ﬁndings of their exper-
iments does not take into account some variables that should have been
considered, but rather that the experiment is faulty in several respects:
their empirical hypothesis is arguably inconsistent, and the setup of the
experiment is ﬂawed.
The structure of my paper is as follows: In section 1, I will summa-
rize the exact empirical hypothesis which Machery et al. examine in their
experiment and present some details of the experiment itself which will
be of relevance, as well as their ﬁndings. In section 2, I point out three
technical problems in the experiment setup. In section 3, conceptual
problems regarding the hypothesis underlying the experiment are dis-
cussed. In section 4, I speculate on possible reasons for the statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two groups, assuming that the authors’
explanation is invalid. Finally, section 5 contains my conclusions.
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1. Summary of Machery et al. (2004)
In philosophical circles, it is widely accepted (though not without ex-
ception) that the so-called causal-historical theory of names1 captures
the way people use proper names more adequately than the so-called
descriptivist theory.
Essentially, the descriptivist theory (which is most prominently rep-
resented by Frege) claims that proper names like ‘Aristotle’ and ‘London’
are synonymous with deﬁnite descriptions like ‘the teacher of Alexander
the Great’ and ‘the capital of Great Britain’, respectively.2 This means
that whenever we use the name ‘Aristotle’ (to refer to a speciﬁc person),
we always have in mind the description that, for us individually, is syn-
onymous with this name. This could be ‘the teacher of Alexander the
Great’, ‘the greatest philosopher of antiquity’, a conjunction of these, or
anything else, as long as it is ﬁxed which description is synonymous with
a given proper name for us. The reference of a proper name is determined
by this description: whatever is denoted by the description will be the
referent of the name.
The causal-historical theory, by contrast, claims that the relationship
between the entity a proper name refers to and the name itself is direct,
i.e., not mediated by a description. Names refer simply by virtue of an
act of naming, where the reference of the name was ﬁxed. All further
uses of the name following the naming act are connected to the naming
act by a historical chain: all those who know what the name ‘London’
refers to know this because they have heard this name being used to refer
to a particular city and therefore established a connection between the
name and the referent.
The reason why the causal-historical theory is regarded as more ad-
equate and the descriptivist theory practically as refuted is that Kripke
(1972/1980) presented some very convincing arguments which demon-
1 I will stick to the terminology used by Machery et al. (2004). Two alternative
designations frequently chosen instead of ‘causal-historical theory of names’ are
the ‘Millian’ theory and the ‘direct reference’ theory. The more or less subtle
connotative and denotative diﬀerences between these designations need not con-
cern us here, since they should be irrelevant to the issue at hand. For two recent
overviews discussing such diﬀerences, cf. Marti (2003) and Jackson (1998).
2 This is, of course a gross simpliﬁcation, but ﬁner qualiﬁcations of the exact rela-
tionship between the description and the proper name or of the exact nature of
the description, for example, would be irrelevant with respect to what Machery
et al. (2004) try to achieve in their experiment.
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strated that the latter theory does not work. Some of these arguments
were thought experiments whose outcomes were consistent with the caus-
al-historical but not with the descriptivist theory. As mentioned above,
Machery et al. (2004) scrutinize this opinion by basically transforming
Kripke’s thought experiments into real experiments.
One of Kripke’s thought experiments, cited as well as adapted by
Machery et al., is the following:
“Suppose that Gödel was not in fact the author of [Gödel’s] theorem. A man
called ‘Schmidt’ [. . .] actually did the work in question. His friend Gödel
somehow got hold of the manuscript and it was thereafter attributed to
Gödel. On the descriptivist view in question, then, when our ordinary man
uses the name Gödel, he really means to refer to Schmidt, because Schmidt
is the unique person satisfying the description ‘the man who discovered the
incompleteness of arithmetic’. [. . .] But it seems we are not.”
(Kripke 1972/1980, 83–4, as cited by Machery et al. 2004)
The same story, reformulated by Machery et al. and used in their exper-
iment, reads as follows:
“Suppose that John has learned in college that Gödel is the man who proved
an important mathematical theorem, called the incompleteness of arith-
metic. John is quite good at mathematics and he can give an accurate
statement of the incompleteness theorem, which he attributes to Gödel as
the discoverer. But this is the only thing that he has heard about Gödel.
Now suppose that Gödel was not the author of this theorem. A man called
‘Schmidt’ whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances
many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend Gödel some-
how got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work, which was
thereafter attributed to Gödel. Thus he has been known as the man who
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Most people who have heard the
name ‘Gödel’ are like John; the claim that Gödel discovered the incomplete-
ness theorem is the only thing they have ever heard about Gödel. When
John uses the name ‘Gödel’, is he talking about:
(A) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic?
or
(B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the
work?”
This text and three further ones (one of which is another version of the
same Gödel story, and two are versions of Kripke’s Jonah story) were
presented to two groups of subjects: US and Hong Kong undergraduate
students (the latter were all Chinese). For each text, they had to choose
one of the two possible answers given. In the case of the text cited,
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Machery et al. regarded answer (A) as a corroboration of the descriptivist
view and answer (B) as one of the causal-historical view.
The empirical hypothesis that the authors wanted to verify by the
experiment is the following: Nisbett and his co-workers claim (see e.g.,
Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett–Norenzayan 2002; Nisbett 2003) that there are
signiﬁcant cognitive diﬀerences between people living in diﬀerent cultures;
they concentrate on comparing East Asians and Westerners. One such
diﬀerence is that whereas “East Asians are more inclined than Westerners
to make categorical judgments on the basis of similarity, Westerners [. . .]
are more disposed to focus on causation in describing the world and clas-
sifying things.” According to Machery et al., we should therefore expect
East Asians to choose the answer that corresponds to the descriptivist
theory more often than Westerners, because of the following:
“on a description theory, the referent has to satisfy the description, but it
need not be causally related to the use of the term. In contrast, on Kripke’s
causal-historical theory, the referent need not satisfy the associated descrip-
tion. Rather, it need only ﬁgure in the causal history (and in the causal ex-
planation of) the speaker’s current use of the word.” (Machery et al. 2004, B5)
The outcome of the experiment, as reported by Machery et al. (2004),
seemed to conﬁrm this hypothesis. There was a statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the two groups. On average, the Chinese participants
chose an answer favoring the descriptivist view almost twice as often as
the US participants. However, as the authors point out, the standard
deviation even within these two groups was surprisingly high.
2. Technical problems
In this section, I would like to draw attention to three problems con-
cerning the setup of the experiments conducted by Machery and his co-
workers. They all involve the phrasing of the texts presented to the
participants of the experiments, and the questions asked. I hope I will be
able to argue convincingly that these problems are serious enough if con-
sidered individually, and jointly render the published results thoroughly
invalid.
The problems are: 1. the appearance of the expression ‘use the name’
and 2. ‘talk about’ in the texts, and 3. the fact that only a choice between
two ready-made answers is given to the participants. I will concentrate
all of my remarks on the version of the Gödel text cited above. However,
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they do in fact apply just as well to all the other texts that Machery
et al. employed in their experiment.
2.1. Using a name
The notion of using a name in the sense as it is intended to be understood
in the context of this text should be familiar to professional linguists and
philosophers of language. However, it might be the case that the average
person on the street does not quite know what is meant by this. The
common use of the expression ‘use a name’ conveys something like ‘to
call yourself by a name that is not yours in order to keep your name
secret’ (this deﬁnition appears in the Longman Dictionary of Contempo-
rary English), like in ‘Grant had checked into a Miami hotel using a false
name.’ Another, somewhat diﬀerent context where it appears would be
something like ‘She usually uses her maiden name.’ The way this expres-
sion appears in the familiar contexts is obviously diﬀerent from the way
it is to be understood in the Gödel text above. When Kripke writes that
someone ‘uses the name Gödel’, he is employing a quasi-technical term.
The concept of using a name, for example, may or may not involve in
such a context a contrast to just mentioning a name. These are philo-
sophical issues the participants of the experiment will never even have
heard about.
The way ‘use the name’ is to be understood in the text is not only
unclear, but the way the utterance in question is described might be far
too abstract to be of any use in an experiment like this.3 What should
3 Kripke’s original text does include a further complication that is not necessarily
carried over to the experiment, since the authors do not mention Gödel’s theo-
rem. The expression ‘Gödel’s theorem’ is for several speakers, including myself,
a proper name itself. To see this, suppose we learned that Peano had already
proven the incompleteness of arithmetic a decade before Gödel, but had pub-
lished it in some obscure place, so it had been forgotten about. In such a case,
the name ‘Gödel’s theorem’ would lose some of its motivation, but it would not
necessarily have to be changed to ‘Peano’s theorem’ or whatever. So, for speakers
whose lexicon contains this proper name, the appearance of ‘Gödel’ in ‘Gödel’s
theorem’ does not constitute a use of the name ‘Gödel’. ‘Gödel’ is only part of
this expression etymologically speaking, but not semantically speaking, because
in the latter sense, ‘Gödel’s theorem’ is, like any other proper name, not trans-
parent. The problem with this is that when one’s only information about Gödel
is that he proved this theorem, a rather frequent “use” of the name ‘Gödel’ would
likely be as part of the expression ‘Gödel’s theorem’. One has to read Kripke very
carefully in order to be able to spot that this is a “use” of this name that has
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005
on intuitions about proper names 287
appear in the text is a concrete situation where John is actually using
the name.4
2.2. Talking about
The expression ‘talking about’ in the question at the end of the text poses
a signiﬁcantly greater problem. This expression is ambiguous in a way
that is relevant to the question that is being examined by the authors. To
see this, picture the following situation: There is a party at which Norah
is a guest. There are two important people at the party in addition to
her: Jonathan and Sebastian. Norah didn’t know them before but was
introduced to them at the party. However, Norah confuses their names:
she thinks Jonathan is called Sebastian and Sebastian Jonathan. Later
in the evening, Norah spots the person actually called Jonathan stealing
her wallet from her handbag. She screams appropriately: “Sebastian is
a thief. He has stolen my wallet.” Now who is Norah talking about?
Well, that depends on whose position you identify yourself with. If you
consider Norah’s position, she is talking about the man (i.e., trying to
refer to the man) she saw stealing her wallet, who she thinks is called
Sebastian. (This man is actually called Jonathan.) If you consider the
position of all the others present who do get the names right, she is
falsely accusing Sebastian of theft, who has actually been drinking beer
peacefully in the company of their host all along.
It is plain to see that essentially the same consideration applies to
the Gödel text cited above. Suppose John (the person in Machery et al.’s
text) said (cf. 2.1.), “Gödel must be a very bright person. I sure would like
to meet him.” or asked someone “How old was Gödel when he discovered
the incompleteness of arithmetic?”.
to be excluded for his thought experiment to work. For the subjects of the ex-
periment who know the expression ‘Gödel’s theorem’ but are not aware of these
philosophical problems, this issue could be a further source of confusion, even
though this expression does not appear in the text explicitly.
4 Several readers have indicated that they do not agree with my claim that the
appearance of ‘use a name’ in this context constitutes a problem. I do not have
any more convincing arguments for this than the above. But the really important
point in my opinion is that it is much clearer to present an actual utterance where
a name is being used (in the sense we would like ‘use a name’ to be understood).
In this way, the problem simply does not arise, and since this does not cost
anything, I think it would be just stubborn and pointless to insist on the original
formulation.
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If you identify yourself with John’s position, he is stating or asking
something about (i.e., means to refer to) the person who, as far as he
knows, really did discover the incompleteness of arithmetic and was called
Gödel. He could not even consider referring to any other relevant person
(especially not Schmidt). So the position of John comes rather close to
answer (A) to the question, although that is not quite right. I will come
back to this in section 2.3.
On the other hand, if you take the position of an external omniscient
observer and do not care about what John does or does not know about
Gödel, then he is talking about (i.e., mentioning the name of) Kurt Gödel
the fraud. This comes rather close to answer (B), but that is not quite
right in this case either. Again, this point will be discussed in section 2.3.
There may, of course, be other notions connected to the expression
‘talk about’ as used in the relevant context for other speakers. Some
may be simply the logical conjunction or alternation of the two (whether
a speaker only has a more restricted or a “holistic” notion of ‘talking
about’, respectively). Some may have a third notion I did not think
about. For all we know about human cognition, some such notion may
even be inconsistent.
Anyway, if you could make sense of the Norah situation above (which,
I assume, is the case for most competent speakers of English), you must
be aware, whether consciously or unconsciously, that these two notions of
‘talking about’ are available normally to any speaker of English.5 This is
true, of course, of the participants of the experiment as well, when they
try to interpret the questions they are supposed to answer. The question
is: How do they go about this? I can see only two possible answers:
1. Assuming there is such a thing as an absolute (i.e., context-
insensitive) concept of prominence of word meanings,6 the reader could
choose the strategy of favoring an interpretation of the ambiguous ques-
tion where the expression causing the ambiguity is interpreted in terms
of its most prominent (i.e., ﬁrst, basic, primary) meaning. Or the most
prominent meaning may be the only one that comes to the reader’s mind
in such a situation.7 The problem is that meaning prominence, even if
we assume that it exists on an individual level, is not like word order or
5 I gloss over some qualiﬁcations of this claim, e.g., you should have an innate
human theory of mind (or some equivalent of this), you should not be autistic etc.
6 For an exposition of this concept, cf. Csatár et al. (2002).
7 Or at least the only one she is able to consciously consider, disregarding the
possible unconscious activation and immediate deactivation of unneeded word
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declension: although there is signiﬁcant agreement between speakers as
to what they qualify as more and less prominent, there is also a patent
variation to be observed. Also, in some cases, speakers can consciously or-
der word meanings according to prominence, whereas in other cases they
cannot.8 We do not know as yet why this should be so. In any event,
if speakers decide on this basis how to interpret the question, the out-
come might tell us something about which interpretation of ‘talk about’
is more prominent for those individual speakers, but nothing whatsoever
about the theories of the semantics of proper names. But normally, our
interpretation is of course not driven by meaning prominence, but rather
by the following.
2. It is much more likely that readers try to make sense of an am-
biguous utterance or a discourse that seems incoherent at ﬁrst sight by
guessing the intentions of the writer. Suppose that you as the reader
have no idea what the person in charge of the experiment would like to
learn, but assume that they have something particular in mind. You
have at your disposal the two above-mentioned possible interpretations
of ‘talk about’ which both make sense in the discourse. If you interpret
the question in one way, answer (A) seems somewhat more appropriate;
if you do it the other way, answer (B) seems better. If you take the con-
junction of the two notions, neither is right. In case you take the logical
alternation, both are. Trying to guess which answer you ought to give in
such a situation is equivalent to throwing a dime.
To correct this problem, the question to be asked should be modiﬁed.
You can either ask “Who is John thinking of?” or “Whose name does
John mention/pronounce?”, depending on what you would like to learn.
Both should be much clearer than the original question.
2.3. Only two choices
As mentioned above, if you carefully consider the two possible answers to
the question asked in the Gödel text, neither of them seems quite right.
For if you take the position of John and choose answer (A), you feel
rather uneasy since this answer contains the word ‘really’, which is hard
meanings, which is widely assumed in the psycholinguistics literature on the basis
of Swinney (1979) and later experiments.
8 At least I do not have the slightest idea which of the two interpretations of ‘talk
about’ I should judge as more prominent than the other out of context.
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to interpret relative to a given context (in this case, John’s thoughts). In
other words, answer (A) would be a rather awkward way of expressing
the idea that Gödel is ‘the person who, according to the information
John has access to, really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic’
(which would be the correct answer in my opinion). In philosophical
terms, ‘really’ is an indexical that wants to refer to the actual world. To
interpret it context-dependently, as suggested above, would be to create
a case of Kaplan’s monster.9
On the other hand, answer (B) is not perfect either, if you interpret
‘talk about’ from the point of view of the external omniscient observer.
Here, one ﬁnds oneself at odds with the fact that one knows that John
mistakenly attributes some property to the referent of the name Gödel.
Furthermore, one should assume that if John knew exactly what the om-
niscient observer of the story knows about Gödel, he would have no reason
to utter something like “Gödel must be a very bright person.” or “How
old was Gödel when he discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic?”.
If one were to answer that when John says such things, he is talk-
ing about (in the sense of pronouncing the actual name of) the person
who did not actually discover the theorem, but “got hold of the manu-
script and claimed credit for the work”, one would deﬁnitely not be lying
(from the omniscient observer’s perspective). However, the answer seems
to be pragmatically inappropriate, since one would withhold relevant10
information and thereby violate Grice’s maxim of quantity; namely, the
information that John does not actually know this. So the correct an-
swer should be something along the lines of “the person who got hold
of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work, although John does
not know this.”
If this is right, both possible answers provided by Machery et al.
are more or less inappropriate. Even if I am wrong about my own sug-
gested answers being the right ones, they seem to be surely appropriate
9 Cf. Kaplan (1989).
10 Why should this information be relevant? I think Blutner (1998)’s theory of lexi-
cal pragmatics or its reformulation in terms of bi-directional optimality theory in
Blutner (2002) could help us formulate an acceptable explanation. ‘Talk about’
is ambiguous as described above, and the speaker knows this. If the speaker
provides the information that John does not know about the information men-
tioned, the hearer will be considerably more likely to correctly infer that ‘talk
about’ is to be understood in its ‘pronounce the name of’ sense than without this
information. Although this is hard to quantify, the gain of being unequivocal will
outweigh the cost associated with being more verbose.
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to me, and obviously diﬀerent from the ones the authors provide. Con-
sequently the two alternatives are without doubt insuﬃcient. At least
a third alternative should be provided, namely, “(C) none of the above,
but rather:”.11 It seems to me that this would even be much more in line
with the ideology behind the experiment: after all, as a Westerner who
conducts the experiment, how should one be able to tell how a person
from another culture, who might think in a way markedly diﬀerent from
yourself, would answer a question like this?
2.4. Interim conclusions
From the three points made in the previous sections, it should have be-
come clear that although the text for the experiment was exactly modeled
on Kripke’s Gödel thought experiment, for someone who does not know
what Kripke tried to prove with this story, the text makes hardly any
sense at all. The essential diﬀerence between Machery et al.’s experiment
and Kripke’s original story is that the former is presented to the reader
completely out of context, whereas the latter appears as a paragraph in
Naming and necessity. On top of this, the audiences of the two texts,
so to speak, are completely diﬀerent. Kripke (1972/1980) is supposed to
be read by philosophers. The participants in the experiment were un-
dergraduate students. One can assume (e.g., on the basis of personal
experience) that some of these students would not have understood the
point of the paragraph in question even if they had read the whole Naming
and necessity, since they lacked the training, the conceptual foundations
and possibly the appropriate mindset to comprehend the idea.
For these technical reasons, the outcome of the experiment is impos-
sible to interpret.12 However, I contend that the experiment was doomed
to failure right from the start for conceptual reasons which I will present
in section 3. Before I get to this, let me present another story that could
11 There is a further serious problem in connection with the two choices: Elementary
experimental methodology would require the order of the (A) and (B) answers be
mixed, since some participants of the experiment would be reluctant to choose
(A) or (B) consistently all the time, even if they thought that was the right
answer. Machery et al. apparently neglected to do this. I am grateful to Janina
Radó for this observation.
12 Carson Schütze (2004) discusses some interesting problems pertaining to experi-
mental methodology in linguistics (syntax, semantics and morphology) which are
somewhat similar to those mentioned above.
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be used in an experiment, which avoids the problems pointed out above
with respect to the Gödel story of Machery et al.:
“Gerhard is a German person who sees the ﬁlm ‘Bram Stoker’s Dracula’ in
the cinema. In Germany, if a ﬁlm is shown that was directed by a very
famous director, the director’s name is often mentioned in the title of the
ﬁlm. Gerhard knows this and is therefore convinced that Bram Stoker was
the director of this movie. He does not know anything else about Bram
Stoker.
But in fact, Bram Stoker was not the director. He was a British writer who
wrote the novel about Dracula which the movie was based upon. He died
in 1912. The ﬁlm was actually directed by Francis Ford Coppola.
After having seen the ﬁlm, Gerhard says to his friend Doris, ‘This was a
great movie. Bram Stoker is a terriﬁc director.’
Question version 1: ‘When he says this, who is Gerhard thinking of?
(A) the person who wrote the novel
(B) the person who directed the movie
(C) none of the above, but rather:’
Question version 2: ‘When he says this, whose name does Gerhard pro-
nounce?
(A) the name of the person who wrote the novel
(B) the name of the person who directed the movie
(C) none of the above, but rather:’”
The diﬀerence compared to the original text should be clear. Be that as
it may, the answer to either of these questions tells us nothing interesting
about the semantics of proper names, as I will argue in the next section.
3. Conceptual problems
In this section, I would like to point out two conceptual problems in con-
nection with the experiment. Both concern the empirical hypothesis that
underlies the experiment, and are completely independent of each other.
The ﬁrst problem is what I think is an inconsistency between the empir-
ical hypothesis on the one hand and the very empirical generalizations
Machery et al. base this hypothesis upon on the other hand. The second
problem is that Kripke’s Gödel story, as it stands, arguably does not
help us at all to empirically decide between the two competing theories
of proper names.
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3.1. Does the causal-historical view involve causation? Is the
descriptivist view holistic?
I have cited above, in section 1, the reason why Machery et al. assume
that Westerners should choose the answer that corresponds to the causal-
historical theory. The most relevant part of the explanation is the fol-
lowing: “Westerners [. . .] are more disposed to focus on causation in
describing the world and classifying things.”
I think it is a rather dubious claim that there should be any causal
reasoning involved in our actual use of proper names. At least it could
be argued that the assumption of a causal relationship is only necessary
as a meta-semantic assumption (i.e., for explanations of semantic facts),
but not as part of the semantics of individual proper names, even if
we assume that the causal-historical theory and particularly its direct
reference claim is basically right. In other words, the statement that
Gödel is called ‘Gödel’ because he got this name, however informative it
may be, might only be needed when we try to explain how Gödel got to
be called ‘Gödel’. For us to be able to use this name to refer to Gödel,
no notion of causation may be required at all, but a simple, primitive
associative link between the mental representations of the name and the
person may be suﬃcient.13
Whereas I assume Machery et al. could defend their position to in-
clude the concept of causation in their account of the semantics of proper
names, it is extremely puzzling why another claim that also appears in
Nisbett and his co-workers’ psychological theory of cognitive relativism
and seems to be highly relevant to the issue under discussion is simply
ignored. As Machery et al. (2004) themselves cite, the most signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between East Asian and Western thinking seems to be that
East Asian thinking is holistic, whereas Western thinking is analytic.
13 Regarding the historical part of the causal-historical theory, Almog 1984 quite
convincingly argues that the historical chain proposed by Kripke as part of the
explanation deﬁnitely does not ﬁgure as a part of a proper name’s semantics, but
only of its meta-semantics in the above sense. Furthermore, the idea of a historical
chain is not speciﬁc to proper names, and therefore this part of Kripke’s theory is
not particularly informative. To all intents and purposes, a historical chain plays
exactly the same part in passing on the usage rules of other content words from
one generation of speakers of a language to the next as it plays in the ﬁxing of the
reference of a proper name. The latter idea is, of course, not just a philosophical
claim, but a fact of sociolinguistics and historical linguistics.
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Western thinking involves “detachment of the object from its con-
text, [and] a tendency to focus on attributes of the object in order to
assign it to categories [. . .]” (Nisbett et al. 2001, 293; cited by Mach-
ery et al. 2004, B5; emphasis added). It is not clear to me whether the
causal-historical theory enters into a holistic-analytic dichotomy with the
descriptivist theory in this respect, but the emboldened part of this cita-
tion surely is a par excellence characterization of the descriptivist view.
Now if we approach the issue from this direction, the descriptivist view
should be the perfect way to capture the use of proper names in Western
societies. And we could take this idea even further. Consider that Frege,
one of the most prominent representatives of the descriptivist view, was
one of the fathers of Western logicism. Surely, this should be taken as
strong evidence that there is an intimate connection between Western
thinking and descriptivism. Or should it?
I think, in view of this dilemma, it would be grossly irresponsible
to continue to construct empirical hypotheses for experiments on the ba-
sis of these ideas, as long as Nisbett and his co-workers’ generalizations
are formulated in such a general and elusive way (witness the hedge “a
tendency to” in the above citation). This is not to say that these gen-
eralizations are not interesting; but they do not seem to constitute an
empirically testable theory in their current state.
To sum up the point of this section: Machery et al.’s empirical hy-
pothesis is arguably inconsistent with the very same theory of cognition
that it is based upon: Whereas it can be deduced from that theory that
Western reasoning should favor a descriptivist account of proper names,
they assume that it favors a causal-historical one.14
3.2. What does follow from the causal-historical theory?
A puzzling aspect of Machery et al.’s paper is that their attitude about
the role the semantic intuitions play in the proper names debate is rather
peculiar. It is as if they thought that the debate revolves around the
correctness of the intuitions themselves. Of course, this would be absurd:
the puzzle that should be solved by the debate is not which answers to
14 It could of course be argued (bearing in mind the qualiﬁcation above) that if
anything, Nisbett et al.’s theory may allow us to formulate inconsistent empirical
hypotheses regarding the semantics of proper names (i.e., Western thinking favors
causal-historical and descriptivist theories at the same time). Obviously, this
would not help to rescue the plausibility of Machery et al.’s empirical hypothesis.
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which questions are right, but instead, what is a correct model of the
mental representation of the semantics of proper names. We would like
to learn something about the mental representation that enables us to
use a proper name, and, on a metalinguistic level, construct a model
that explains why we use a proper name in the way we do. The thought
experiments are just a way of testing the adequacy of the models by
probing their predictions.
However, some parts of Machery et al.’s paper certainly suggest an
interpretation that they regard the role of intuitions in a diﬀerent way
than is usual, and, at least in the case of Kripke, obviously intended.
Particularly, I cannot ﬁnd any other reasonable explanation for the fact
that they obviously regard the outcome of their experiment as the most
natural thing on earth. For most philosophers of language, the fact that
approximately half of the Western participants gave answers that cor-
responded with the causal-historical view, whereas the other half gave
answers of the other kind would probably have rung the alarm bells that
there is something wrong with the results. For it seems rather miracu-
lous how a linguistic community could function if there were such huge
diﬀerences even in as substantial issues as how to use a proper name to
refer.15 The only obvious interpretation of the results of the experiment
that is not contrary to common sense seems to me to take the answers
to be no more than largely appropriate reactions to strange questions,
and not evidence of diﬀerences in the actual mental representations of
the meanings of proper names in general (which is what such answers
ought to be).16 Incidentally, as I argued in section 2, they would have
been right to assume this with regard to the experiment reported.
15 Of course, the claim that such diﬀerences would cause problems in a linguistic
community is an essentially empirical claim itself, and could well be wrong. I do
not really see a way how we could test its validity (save using thought experi-
ments), but it seems to me very plausible.
16 The authors’ discussion about the role and reliability of semantic intuitions is
similarly puzzling. They seem to have two philosophical views on intuitions in
mind: One view would be interested in the intuitions themselves. And only
the second view would be “a proto-scientiﬁc project modeled on the Chomskyan
tradition in linguistics. Such a project would employ intuitions about reference
to develop an empirically adequate account of the implicit theory that underlies
ordinary uses of names.” (Machery et al. 2004, B9). Of course, the second view
is the way in which the thought experiments and the intuitions on them should
be understood. In fact, I cannot imagine any other sensible way to construe these
theories of proper names, and the authors unfortunately do not explain what the
other alternative exactly is that they have in mind.
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Nevertheless, the relevant question is if one can construct real ex-
periments that can be employed as empirical evidence to argue for one
or the other theory of proper names, or for or against the universality of
such a semantic theory, for that matter. The answer is, of course, yes.
However, Kripke’s Gödel thought experiment is unfortunately not suited
for this purpose. It could be argued that Kripke got the result of this
thought experiment wrong. The ordinary man he mentions would, in
fact, really mean to refer to the person who really formulated the the-
orem. This is much more apparent in the Bram Stoker story than in
Kripke’s: Gerhard obviously does not mean to refer to (i.e., “is thinking
of”) the real Bram Stoker, the writer, but to the director of the movie,
whatever his name is. On the other hand, it takes no genius to spot
that Gerhard “pronounces” (i.e., mentions) the name of the writer, and
not the director. It is just a simple reading comprehension exercise. In
particular, it does not have anything to do with either theory of names
whatsoever. I do not have the room to discuss this here, but I elaborate
on this proposition in Pethő (2004).
In fact, standard Fregean descriptivist theories, which Machery et al.
have in mind, could be tested experimentally by constructing very simple
scenarios that involve a change in the only known (or at least “deﬁning”)
property of a certain individual.17 For example, imagine a situation where
Frank’s boss is called Paul and the only thing that Frank’s wife Catherine
knows about Paul is that he is Frank’s boss. One could ask participants
in an experiment whether Frank’s boss would still be called Paul if he
moved on to some other position, and whether Frank’s new boss would
be called Paul as well. Or one could ask them to judge whether it would
be reasonable for Catherine to keep referring to Frank’s new boss as Paul
or not referring to his old boss as Paul anymore. This would be after
all essentially what we would expect to happen if a speaker identiﬁes the
meaning of a proper name with a description. Furthermore, if one takes
for granted the conclusions of Machery et al.’s experiment, it should be
fairly normal if Frank and Catherine disagreed about whether it is correct
to call Frank’s new boss Paul (since, according to these conclusions, there
are lots of speakers in our society according to whom proper names work
in the descriptivist way and equally lots who think it’s the other way
round).
17 This does not hold for non-standard theories, like e.g., quotational theories of
proper names or ones involving temporal relativization of the deﬁning property.
I discuss this point in Pethő (2004).
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There is yet another minor conceptual issue worth noting that ob-
viously escaped Machery et al.’s attention. Suppose the Chinese, the
Bantu, the Hungarians or whoever gave answers in this latter experi-
ment that pointed consistently toward the conclusion that members of
this speech community were using their proper names according to the
descriptivist theory of names. Suppose further that speakers of English
and German gave answers of the inverse kind. Would it be a legitimate
conclusion that proper names in those other languages functioned diﬀer-
ently from proper names in English? Hardly. The only thing we could
reasonably conclude is that the languages in question seemed to lack
proper names in the sense English and German have them, but only had
descriptions. If there were such a language, this would arguably be major
news, but deﬁnitely not for the theory of proper names.
3.3. Interim conclusions
The aim of this section was to demonstrate that the experiment had
no chance to achieve what it was supposed to, because the hypothesis it
tried to verify was not consistent with the theory it should have produced
evidence for. Furthermore, it was suggested that Kripke’s Gödel thought
experiment was not the ideal way to test the validity of the descriptivist
versus the causal-historical theory of names. Instead, another possible
test was outlined.
4. How to interpret the outcome of the experiment
Whatever problems there were with the experiment, a statistically signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence was observed for the Gödel text between Western and East
Asian participants: the East Asians tended to reply that John is talking
about the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic.
Since the groups tested were not particularly large, it would be in-
teresting if another control experiment could conﬁrm these diﬀerences.18
But assuming that this eﬀect was not just due to a coincidence, I would
18 László Nemes actually did carry out basically the same experiments that Machery
et al. report. Two groups of college students participated in these experiments:
nurses-in-training and physiotherapists-in-training, all Hungarians. Much to his
surprise, he found that there were similarly signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
replies of the nurses vs the physiotherapists as between the Western and East
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like to make an educated guess as to what might have caused the dif-
ference.
If one accepts the characterization of East Asian vs. Western think-
ing by Nisbett which was apparently corroborated by Weinberg et al.
(2001), the relevant diﬀerence in the results could possibly be attributed
to a diﬀerence in the strategies of comprehending texts employed by East
Asians and Westerners: since Westerners detach objects from their con-
texts, as mentioned above, this may lead them to see the Gödel story
just as a simple comprehension task, in which they are to ﬁnd in the text
who the name mentioned really applies to, independent of context. This
would be Gödel the fraud, i.e., answer (B). Westerners gave this answer
about 55% of the time, which is slightly above chance.
On the other hand, East Asians characteristically seem to regard
themselves as parts of a community. This could involve empathy and
willingness to identify oneself with the position of community members,
in contrast to the individualism of the Westerners. And it would deﬁnitely
involve a blind acceptance of widely held beliefs as truths, as emphasized
by Weinberg et al. (2001). Empathy would lead them to identify their
position with that of John, which would compel them to accept answer
(A) as more appropriate (since, as I argued, answer A is the better one
from the perspective of John). In addition to this, as the text explicitly
states, most other people are like John, i.e., would use the name in the
same way as John, which would in eﬀect make it the right way in the eye
of a Chinese person. This could be a reason why the Chinese selected
answer (A) about 68% of the time for the Gödel story.
There is, however, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the case of the Jonah
stories between East Asians and Westerners, and in both groups, answer
(B) occurs more often (ca. 60% of the time). If one continues the above
line of thought, one notices that on the one hand, in the Jonah stories
the fact that the beliefs of the community would suggest answer (A) is
made just as clear as in the case of the Gödel stories. On the other hand,
there is no actual person (just an anonymous average German high school
student) to identify oneself with in one story, whereas in the other text,
although there is such a person, her appearances at the beginning and the
end of the text seem to be less salient subjectively, since the story is much
longer and more complicated. So the fact that the previous eﬀect is not
observable in the Jonah cases may be attributed to the fact that a person
Asian groups of Machery et al. Let us not examine in detail what this probably
means. I would like to thank László Nemes for sharing the results with me.
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the reader could identify herself with is missing or less salient. If we
compare the results of the Jonah cases with the Gödel cases, this would
also mean that the presence of a person who one could identify oneself
with would play a signiﬁcantly more important role in East Asians’ choice
of answers than the presence of a community opinion.
However, as I mentioned in section 3, this is all just irresponsible
speculation and should not be taken seriously.
5. Conclusions
The main aim of this paper was to point out how important consider-
ations of experimental design turn out to be in connection with testing
the universality claim of the causal-historical theory of names. I hope to
have shown that a much more straightforward experimental task could
have produced far more plausible results. Although Stich and colleagues’
idea, that classic thought experiments should be subjected to empirical
testing in order to ascertain that they do not reﬂect the views of only a
tiny minority of scholars but in fact of humans in general, does seem rea-
sonable at ﬁrst sight, this experiment demonstrates the dangers of tearing
individual thought experiments out of their context. Texts which may be
fairly straightforward in their original context can turn out to be misun-
derstandable or even seemingly incoherent if this happens. Whether the
results of an experiment conﬁrm or contradict the accepted view(s) con-
cerning a thought experiment, the uncertainty remains that they might
arise from the misinterpretation or simply lack of understanding of the
problem at hand, rather than reﬂect what the participants really think
about the thought experiment (if it makes sense to say this at all; cf.
Weatherson 2003 for a deeper investigation of the philosophical conse-
quences of similar problems).
The last thing I wanted to achieve was to create the impression that
empirical investigations of semantic intuitions were useless or uninterest-
ing. I believe that exactly the opposite is the case, not just for epistemol-
ogy (cf. Weinberg et al. 2001) and questions concerning the philosophy
of language (as in Machery et al. 2004), but just as importantly in lin-
guistic semantics (cf. Csatár et al. 2002 and Pafel 2001). However, the
problems encountered by Machery et al. (2004) show that one has to
be extremely careful when trying to adapt a philosophical thought ex-
periment and transform it into a real experiment. It seems that taking
an actual situation that may even be quite likely to occur, and asking
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subjects about how they would behave in such a situation (or how they
would expect others to behave) seems the best way to choose. The less
abstract the situation is and the less linguistic behavior is involved the
better. Another conclusion that seems to suggest itself is that one has
to be extremely careful about the lexical semantic properties of words
that appear in such an experiment. A lexical ambiguity, even if it is too
ﬁne to be explicitly mentioned in a dictionary, could ruin the results.19
It seems that although the distance between linguistic semantics and the
philosophy of language has continuously increased in the past 25 years
(cf. Nunberg 2002), they may still have something interesting to say to
each other, and face similar problems.
A ﬁnal point is that the relative and absolute weight of factors such
as social expectations needs to be carefully established if one has reason
to believe that they aﬀect the answers given (even if as extrinsic factors),
as also pointed out e.g., by Weinberg et al. (2001).
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